





PROVIDING BROADER SIXTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS: WE CAN AFFORD TO GIVE 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS MORE  
Shane K. Rogers0F* 
Though the Framers intended for the Sixth Amendment 
to secure criminal defendants’ right to a fair trial by providing 
them with the right to effective assistance of counsel, the full right 
to effective assistance of counsel is not currently guaranteed.  A 
recent Sixth Circuit case, Turner v. United States, held that a 
defendant does not have the right to effective assistance of counsel 
until the right to counsel attaches.  This is troubling given that in 
Turner, the defendant, John Turner, received a sentence ten years 
greater than the sentence he would have received but for his state 
counsel’s ineffectiveness.  The Sixth Circuit rejected Turner’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because under current 
jurisprudence, the right to counsel has a bright-line rule: it does 
not attach until an indictment is brought or the defendant is 
brought before a judge.  Turner’s attorney for his state case 
negotiated a plea deal with federal prosecutors before a federal 
indictment was brought, and therefore, the right to counsel did 
not attach in the federal case.  Thus, Turner did not have the 
right to effective assistance of counsel.   
This tension between ineffective assistance of counsel and 
when the right to such counsel attaches is striking: it deprives 
criminal defendants of a Sixth Amendment right.  Courts can 
resolve this tension, however, by recognizing that (1) effective 
assistance of counsel is an independent Sixth Amendment right; 
(2) the right to counsel raises different administrative and 
fairness concerns than effective assistance of counsel; and 
(3) courts apply the different strands of the Sixth Amendment 
independently, differently, and respective of the concerns the 
particular case raises.  Furthermore, courts should promptly 
resolve this tension because the racial disparity in outcomes 
indicates that Turner situations will fall unevenly along poor 
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and minority lines.  The Sixth Amendment will not completely 
and effectively fulfill its purpose of guaranteeing criminal 
defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel unless it is 
properly interpreted to protect defendants like John Turner.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“A justice system which tolerates injustice is doomed to 
collapse.”1 
 
A recent Sixth Circuit Case, Turner v. United States, 
shows how criminal procedure jurisprudence fails to provide 
adequate protections for those who need it most.2  The Sixth 
                                               
1 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 
iii (2d ed. 2008) (quoting Leonard Noisette, former director, Neighborhood 




2 Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel, 
but it also provides a defendant the right to effective assistance 
of counsel.3  Right to counsel law, however, seems to preclude 
providing relief for ineffective assistance of counsel received 
during pre-indictment plea negotiations.4  The Supreme Court 
has not directly ruled on the issue,5 but circuit courts have held 
that the right to counsel must attach before a defendant has 
the right to effective assistance of counsel and therefore have not 
entertained the merits of whether counsel can be ineffective 
pre-indictment.6  This is unjust.  The technical application of when 
the right to counsel attaches is in tension with full protection 
against ineffective assistance of counsel.  This tension may exac-
erbate the stark disparities between the wealthy and poor that 
exist in the criminal justice system.   
The facts of Turner exemplify when this tension arises.  
John Turner was charged under Tennessee state law with four 
counts of armed robbery.7  Turner’s attorney represented him 
during plea negotiations with a state prosecutor.  During the 
plea negotiations, the state prosecutor informed Turner’s attorney 
that federal prosecutors also wanted to charge Turner with 
federal robbery and federal firearms charges.8  Federal prosecutors 
then reached out to Turner’s attorney and offered a plea deal 
that would result in a fifteen-year sentence—sixty-seven years 
below the maximum sentence Turner was facing.9  The federal 
prosecutors offered this plea deal before bringing a federal 
indictment and told Turner’s attorney that the offer expired upon 
such an indictment.10  Turner avers that he was never told about 
the plea deal before it lapsed.11  He hired a new attorney and 
pleaded to a twenty-five-year sentence in the federal case.12  
Turner brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but 
                                               
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
4 This was the outcome in Turner, 885 F.3d 949. 
5 Turner’s lawyers filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court 
on July 20, 2018.  Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018), petition 
for cert. filed, No. 18-106 (July 20, 2018). 
6 Id. at 955. 
7 Id. at 951. 
8 Id. at 952. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
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the Sixth Circuit held that Turner could not be granted relief for 
ineffective assistance of counsel,13 reasoning that he did not 
yet have the right to counsel in the federal case.14 
Indigent defendants are significantly impacted by their 
inability to gain relief for ineffective assistance during pre-
indictment plea negotiations.  Consider Turner’s situation, 
which arose because there were both state and federal charges.  
This is not an unusual situation due to the increasing federal- 
ization of crime.15  In this type of situation, an indigent defendant 
must use a state-appointed attorney in the state case and a 
federally appointed attorney in the federal case.16  But the defend- 
ant does not currently receive the right to a federal attorney until 
after a federal indictment.17  As a result, the state attorney deals 
with any federal pre-indictment plea deals.  The state attorney 
may fail to provide efficient representation in federal pre-
indictment plea negotiations.18  As Turner suggests, such a defend- 
ant may not only be deprived of an opportunistic plea deal, but 
also denied recourse for an attorney’s inability to relay the 
opportunity.19  At the very least, the tension between the right to 
counsel’s attachment and ineffective assistance during pre-
                                               
13 Id. at 955. 
14 Id. (“But Turner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet 
attached during those preindictment plea negotiations.  There can be no 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel where there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in the first place.”). 
15 See generally Dick Thornburgh et al., The Growing Federalization 
of Criminal Law, 31 N.M. L. REV. 135 (2001).  
16 A defendant will most likely need a different attorney for her 
federal prosecution and state prosecution because the state public attorney 
system is funded and operated differently than the federal public defense 
system.  See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 
179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 3 (2000) (showing that the 
only types of counsel in federal district court criminal cases were private 
attorneys, federal defender organizations, or pro se, and never included any 
state public defenders).  
17 Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191, 225 (2008).  
18 Public defenders are not inherently less competent than a private 
attorney, but a lapse in communicating a plea deal seems plausible given 
the often-massive case load of a public defender and limited resources.  See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 231175, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL 
PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7FK-V8SM] (finding that seventy-
three percent of county-based public defenders exceeded the maximum 
recommended limit of cases received per attorney).   
19 This was the outcome in Turner, 885 F.3d at 952. 
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indictment plea negotiations is more likely to arise for indigent 
defendants.   
This tension should cause concern, particularly when 
considering that in 2012, “97 percent of federal cases and 94 per- 
cent of state cases”20 and “90 to 95 percent of [public defenders’] 
clients plead[ed] guilty.”21  Because guilty pleas are ubiquitous, 
prosecutors have an incentive to begin the negotiations as early 
as possible, including pre-indictment.22  This tension within 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence should not be accepted, and a 
variety of realities plaguing the criminal justice system exacer-
bate the urgency for resolution of this injustice.  First, Attorney 
General Eric Holder acknowledged that the criminal justice 
system fails to provide competent legal services to the poor.23  
Second, grave disparities exist in plea outcomes for African 
American defendants, who are more likely to rely on public 
defenders compared to White defendants.24   
                                               
20 Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the “Bazaar” of Plea 
Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/ 
stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html [https://perma.cc/ 
F5BH-5V8E].  
21 Jaeah Lee et al., Charts: Why You’re in Deep Trouble If You Can’t 
Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts/# [https://per 
ma.cc/VP8E-428D]. 
22 Teresa White Carns & John Kruse, A Re-Evaluation of Alaska’s 
Plea Bargaining Ban, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 27, 38 (1991) (“By 1989, however, 
Anchorage prosecutors were describing the routine ‘pre-indictment’ hearings 
as opportunities for charge bargaining in most cases.” (footnote omitted)); 
Steven J. Mulroy, The Bright Line’s Dark Side: Pre-Charge Attachment of 
the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 92 WASH. L. REV. 213, 217 (2017) 
(“[P]re-indictment plea negotiations are not uncommon.”); David N. Yellen, 
Two Cheers for a Tale of Three Cities, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 567, 569 (1992) (“[I]t 
is likely that [pre-indictment plea] bargaining has increased under the [federal 
sentencing] guidelines . . . .”). 
23 Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the 
Justice Department's 50th Anniversary Celebration of the U.S. Supreme 
Court Decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.justice 
.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-justice-departments-
50th-anniversary-celebration-us [https://perma.cc/6PDK-2MXJ].  
24 See generally Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities 
in Plea Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2018); see also WOLF HARLOW, 
supra note 16, at 9 (finding that about seventy-seven and seventy-three 
percent of Black and Hispanic defendants, respectively, used a public defender 
in state cases, and about sixty-five and fifty-six percent of Black and Hispanic 
defendants used a public defender in federal cases, respectively).  
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Having an attorney during plea negotiations and even-
tually at the plea deal acceptance provides the most adequate 
protection for defendants.  This is especially true for any poor 
or minority individuals who have been charged with a crime 
and have no knowledge of the law.  The right to counsel poses 
larger problems that are beyond the scope of this Note.  This 
Note argues that indigent defendants who have pre-indictment 
counsel in some capacity must also have the right to effective 
assistance of counsel relief under the Sixth Amendment for any 
pre-indictment plea bargaining that takes place.25  Admittedly, 
pre-indictment plea negotiations are more likely to take place 
in the white-collar setting than for “street crimes.”  This Note, 
however, argues that the facts exemplified by Turner (“Turner 
situations”) both happen and result in outcomes that have a 
profound impact on poor and minority defendants.  The Court 
should consider this when analyzing Sixth Amendment relief 
for pre-indictment plea negotiations.26  
This Note further argues that the supposed Sixth 
Amendment tension between ineffective assistance of counsel 
and the right to counsel can and should be resolved.  In Part II, 
this Note details the law on when the right to counsel attaches.  
Significantly, it does not currently exist for pre-indictment plea 
deals, which presumably also precludes ineffective assistance 
of counsel relief for advice during pre-indictment plea negotia-
tions.  Next, Part III shows that providing ineffective assistance 
of counsel relief for pre-indictment plea negotiations is not an 
affront to Supreme Court precedent because the right to effective 
assistance of counsel is an independent Sixth Amendment 
right, and the Court applies the different strands of the Sixth 
Amendment in relation to the different administrative and 
fairness concerns each raise.  The socioeconomic and racial 
disparities that exist in the criminal justice system, as well as 
the extent to which the inability to gain relief for ineffective 
assistance of counsel during pre-indictment plea negotiations 
exacerbates this disparity, are discussed in Part III.  Part IV 
                                               
25 Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding 
that ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised unless the right to 
counsel attaches).  
26 Id. at 952 (deciding to review whether the right to counsel had 
attached instead of ruling on ineffective assistance of counsel for a defendant 
charged with aggravated robbery).  
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concludes by arguing that courts can apply the ineffective as-
sistance of counsel standard to pre-indictment plea negotiations 
whenever an attorney represents a defendant in some capacity.  
 
II. COURTS HAVE DETERMINED WHEN AND WHERE THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACHES 
EXCEPT FOR PRE-INDICTMENT PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
It is important to understand both where ineffective 
assistance of counsel and right to counsel attachment law 
currently stand and why there is ostensible tension between 
the two.  The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”27  Early on, the Sixth 
Amendment was understood to protect all criminal defendants 
in federal cases.28  In 1963, the Supreme Court recognized the 
fundamental unfairness of a state justice regime that limits 
access to counsel for defendants without resources.  The Court 
then interpreted the Sixth Amendment to require states to 
provide counsel for all indigent defendants in a felony criminal 
case29 or for any crime that will result in imprisonment for six 
or more months.30  Over time, courts have highlighted the pivotal 
role lawyers play in ensuring defendants are guaranteed a fair 
trial and defending against the potential deprivation of one’s 
liberty.  Still, the Supreme Court needed answers to two ques-
tions: (1) when exactly does the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attach, thus requiring that a lawyer be provided, and 
(2) are there any implied rights regarding the right to counsel?  
The Supreme Court made clear in Rothgery v. Gillespie 
that a bright-line rule determines when the right to counsel 
attaches and a lawyer is needed.31  As most bright-line rules 
function, the rule draws a visible, clear line—criminal defend- 
ants must stand in front of a judge or be formally charged before 
they have the right to an attorney.32  Some lower courts have 
                                               
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
28 Mulroy, supra note 22, at 219 (citing Luis v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016)); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).  
29 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
30 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1971). 
31 See Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191 (2008). 
32 Id. at 198. 
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bent the line at times and instead apply a standard approach.33  
The standard approach implies that there are times before an 
individual stands before a judge or is indicted when the state is 
extremely adversarial.  The standard approach supports an 
understanding of the right to counsel as commencing protection 
for a defendant whenever the state begins to use the law as a 
sword.  The Supreme Court is, however, clear that a bright-line 
rule must apply at that point.34  
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the 
right to effective assistance of counsel.35  The Court found that 
the Due Process Clause requires a fair trial and the Sixth 
Amendment defines what a fair trial is.36  The Strickland court 
then held that a fair trial includes effective assistance of counsel.37  
In a system that emphasizes the role of counsel to ensure fair 
outcomes, the right to counsel is meaningless absent protection 
against inadequate counsel.  Unlike with a right to counsel 
claim, courts apply a standard to determine whether there is 
ineffective assistance of counsel at a critical point in the proceed-
ings.38  Ineffectiveness can only be proven by showing that counsel 
was inadequate and that the inadequate performance also 
prejudiced the defense in such a way that the defendant was 
“deprive[d] . . . of a fair trial.”39  
As Turner highlights, right to counsel law currently denies 
relief for ineffective assistance of counsel received pre-indictment 
when staggered charges are brought by a state prosecutor and a 
federal prosecutor.40  This Part offers a succinct analysis of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel and the right to counsel Sixth 
                                               
33 Mulroy, supra note 22, at 217. 
34 See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198.   
35 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel is discussed in Section II.A.  
36 Id. at 685. 
37 Id. 
38 See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198 (showing that the right to counsel 
has a bright-line rule).   
39 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
40 Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 2018).  
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Amendment strands.41  The analysis concludes with contrasting 
the two stands in hopes of highlighting the problem with the 
current friction. 
 
A. Current Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Law 
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment 
protects criminal defendants from ineffective assistance of 
counsel.42  The watershed case, Strickland v. Washington, is a 
case in which the Court found that there was no ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the face of substantial defense counsel 
shortcomings.43  In Strickland, a criminal defendant pleaded 
guilty to three murders and received the death penalty.44  The 
defendant then raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
for his attorney’s decision not to seek a psychiatric evaluation and 
present other meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge.  
The Court found that the attorney’s conduct did not amount to 
ineffective assistance of counsel.45  
The Strickland court established the standard for eval-
uating ineffective assistance of counsel claims: a defendant must 
prove that his legal counsel was not reasonably effective and that 
the ineffectiveness had a prejudicial effect.46  Far from a bright-
line rule, a judge must make an individual judgement to determine 
whether counsel’s actions were objectively impermissible.  De-
termining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel is 
intensely dependent on the facts of the case.  This stands in stark 
contrast to the right to counsel, where the judge merely inquires 
whether a defendant has seen a judge or been indicted.47 
                                               
41 For further analysis, see Brandon K. Breslow, Signs of Life in the 
Supreme Court’s Uncharted Territory: Why the Right to Effective Assistance 
of Counsel Should Attach to Pre-Indictment Plea Bargaining, 62 FED. L. 35, 
35 (2015) (arguing that the dicta in these cases can help extend the Sixth 
Amendment to pre-indictment plea bargaining).  
42 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. 
43 Id. at 669.  
44 Id. at 672–75. 
45 Id. at 698. 
46 Id. at 687. 
47 See Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (summarizing 
the Court’s precedent regarding the right to counsel as having “pegged com-
mencement” of a criminal prosecution to “‘the initiation of adversary judicial 
criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment’”).  
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The Supreme Court has, in a line of cases, found a cog-
nizable ineffective assistance of counsel claim specifically for 
advice given during post-indictment plea negotiations.48  This 
type of claim is available for both possible outcomes of the ne-
gotiations: plea deals that are accepted and plea deals that lapse 
or are denied.49  The difference is in measuring prejudice.  When 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim stems from an ac-
cepted plea deal, the defendant must “show that there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”50 
Significantly, in Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court not 
only extended its ineffective assistance of counsel analysis to 
lapsed or denied plea deals, but also noted that a plausible 
remedy for ineffective counsel during plea deals would be to 
simply sentence the defendant according to the original plea 
deal.51  That is, the remedy may be that the defendant is sen-
tenced consistent with the plea deal that defense counsel’s de-
ficient assistance precluded the defendant from accepting.  In 
Lafler, the defendant was counseled to reject a plea deal with a 
recommendation for a fifty-one to eighty-five-month sentence for 
murder.52  Lafler’s attorney wrongly believed that because the 
victim of the crime was shot below the waist, the state could not 
prove Lafler’s intent to murder.53  The defendant was ultimately 
found guilty based on defense counsel’s wrong assumption and 
was sentenced to 185 to 360 months.54  He successfully claimed in- 
effective assistance of counsel and was offered the original plea 
deal as a remedy.55  
Succinctly, ineffective assistance of counsel applies a 
standard approach to determining whether a defendant should 
be granted relief based on counsel conduct at trial or during 
plea deals.  In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
line of cases does not apply a standard approach. 
                                               
48 See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 
U.S. 134 (2012); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
49 See Lafler, 566 U.S. 156 (plea denied); Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (plea 
lapsed); Hill, 474 U.S. 52 (plea accepted). 
50 Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  
51 See generally Lafler, 566 U.S. 156; Frye, 566 U.S. 134. 
52 Lafler, 566 U.S. at 161. 
53 Id. at 166. 
54 Id. at 160, 166. 
55 Id. at 174.  
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B. Right to Counsel for Pre-Indictment Interrogations 
Has a Bright-Line Rule 
In United States v. Gouveia, the Court held that there is 
no Sixth Amendment right to counsel during pre-indictment 
interrogations.56  Originally, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court 
seemed to create advantageous rules for resourceful defend-
ants.57  In Escobedo, the Supreme Court held that when an 
“investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved 
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,” the Sixth 
Amendment right attaches and a defendant can have a lawyer 
present if demanded during police interrogations before the 
filing of any charges.58  However, because this case dealt with 
police conduct and not prosecutors’ conduct, Escobedo is in-
terpreted as a Fifth Amendment case and has diverged from 
relevant precedent analyzing Sixth Amendment protections.59  
Gouveia held that a blanket rule applies to both indigent 
and wealthy criminal defendants: the right to counsel “attaches 
only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.”60  
In Gouveia, two prisoners were accused of killing another in-
mate.61  Prison officials removed the accused men from general 
population, placed them in administrative segregation, and 
conducted interrogations without counsel present.62  The de-
fendants were held in segregation for nineteen months while 
the prison investigated the incident, which included additional 
interrogations of the defendants.  Finally, a grand jury indicted 
                                               
56 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984).   
57 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).  
58 Id.  
59 Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Miranda and Massiah: How 
to Revive the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel as a Tool for Regulating 
Confessions, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1085, 1101 (2017) (“In Miranda, the Court . . . . 
reinterpreted Escobedo as a Fifth Amendment case (thus destroying Escobedo’s 
precedential value for Sixth Amendment purposes) . . . .” (footnote omitted)); 
see also Mulroy, supra note 22, at 225 (“In Kirby, the Court explained that 
‘the Court in retrospect perceived that the “prime purpose” of Escobedo was 
not to vindicate the . . . right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, “to 
guarantee the full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.’” 
(quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). 
60 Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187. 
61 Id. at 182. 
62 Id.  
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the two suspects.63  The men argued that their Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel had been violated when they were held for 
nineteen months in segregation while interrogations were being 
conducted without being appointed counsel.64 
The Supreme Court relied on a sweeping, bright-line 
rule: before any formal charges are brought, an individual is 
not afforded the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel.65  There-
fore, the defendants in Gouveia did not have their Sixth 
Amendment right violated.  The implications of the holding in 
Gouveia are that if a defendant cannot pay for a lawyer to be 
available at the start of a criminal investigation, the defendant 
ultimately is not afforded the ability to have one.66  Indigent 
defendants during pre-indictment interrogations are not 
afforded the right to counsel during those interrogations. 
 
C. Right to Counsel for Pre-Indictment Lineups Has 
a Bright-Line Rule  
In Kirby v. Illinois, the Supreme Court was also clear 
that an individual is not afforded the Sixth Amendment’s right 
to counsel in pre-indictment lineups.67  There, a plurality of the 
Court agreed that the right to counsel has a clear, distinct line; 
the right attaches only when “adversary judicial proceedings 
have been initiated against [a defendant].”68   
The facts of Kirby illustrate the problems that can arise 
from a bright-line rule, especially for those who cannot demand 
that a lawyer be present.  In that case, someone had robbed 
the victim and that victim reported the theft to the police.69  
The following day, police stopped Kirby because the officers 
misidentified him as someone with an arrest warrant for an 
                                               
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 187.  
66 Though a wealthy defendant may not have the right to have his 
counsel present, a poor defendant receives no counsel at all.  A wealthy 
defendant can summarize the interrogation to his retained attorney and be 
counseled on how to proceed and the implications of his interrogation.  A 
poor defendant does not receive this benefit because of this ruling.  This can 
be used to force indigent defendants to accept plea deals.  
67 406 U.S. 682, 687 (1972).  
68 Id. at 688 (denying the right to counsel to a defendant who was 
placed in a pre-indictment witness lineup and identified by the victim).  
69 Id. at 684. 
336 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 9:2 
 
unrelated crime.70  When Kirby produced his identification, he 
also displayed a wallet that had the complaining witness’s 
identification inside.71  This made the officers suspicious, so 
they brought him to the police station.72  The officers did not 
know about the reported robbery until they brought him to the 
station.73  Without Kirby’s knowledge, and before he was advised 
of his right to counsel, the robbery victim was called to the 
station and subsequently identified Kirby as the robber.74  Kirby 
was indicted for the robbery six weeks later, and the victim’s 
identification of him during the pre-indictment lineup was used 
at trial.75 
The Supreme Court declined Kirby’s motion to suppress 
the pre-indictment lineup evidence.76  It found that while the 
exclusionary rule applies to post-indictment lineups, the same 
cannot be said about pre-indictment lineups because the right 
to counsel had not attached.77  The Court found that the police 
were conducting a routine investigation and declined to hold 
that it was adversarial before the state had “committed itself to 
prosecute.”78  This is evidence that there is no Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel for pre-indictment lineups.    
 
D. Right to Counsel Bright-Line Rule Excludes the 
Role of the Prosecutor in Determining When the 
Right to Counsel Attaches  
The bright-line rule applies as stated: an indictment 
must be filed or the defendant must have come before a judge.79  
This is true regardless of prosecutorial knowledge of whether 
                                               
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 684–85.  
75 Id. at 685. 
76 Id. at 690. 
77 Id. at 688; see also Wayne H. Carlton, Jr. & Carol A. Tootle, Note, 
Constitutional Law—Criminal Procedure—Counsel Required at Lineup 
Only If Formal Judicial Proceedings Have Been Initiated, 47 TUL. L. REV. 
899 (1973) (arguing that while Kirby implemented a bright-line rule, the 
Court ignored fairness and justice in doing so).  
78 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.  
79 Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191, 206 (2008). 
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the judicial proceedings took place.80  In Rothgery v. Gillespie, 
the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held what 
is arguably the Supreme Court’s clearest application of a bright-
line rule determining when the right to counsel attaches.81  
Rothgery invokes a strong principle—a judicial proceeding or 
an indictment will invoke a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel, and prosecutorial knowledge of the judicial pro-
ceeding is irrelevant.82  This is a strong indication that the 
bright-line rule leaves no room for discretion and excludes the 
right to counsel for any pre-indictment context. 
In that case, Rothgery was wrongly arrested for “felon 
in possession of a firearm” after a background check erroneously 
reported that he had been previously convicted of a felony.83  
Following Texas’ criminal procedure, he went before a magis-
trate judge who was to determine whether there was probable 
cause for his arrest and to set bail.84  Rothgery was indigent and 
at various times requested counsel, but the local court declined 
his request.85  However, the state prosecutor never knew that 
Rothgery was arrested and had appeared before a judge.86  
Eventually, a Texas grand jury indicted Rothgery, but a state 
prosecutor dismissed the indictment once Rothgery finally 
obtained a lawyer who showed that the criminal record was 
erroneous.87 Rothgery sued for violation of his Sixth Amendment 
rights, but the Fifth Circuit denied relief because the state 
prosecutor did not have knowledge of the case.88  The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument.89  The Court held that “the first 
formal proceeding is the point of attachment.”90  This new bright-
line rule seems to indicate that the first formal proceeding is 
                                               
80 Id. at 210.  
81 Rebecca Yoder, Rothgery v. Gillespie County: Applying the Supreme 
Court’s Latest Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence to North Carolina Criminal 
Procedure, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 477, 481 (2011) (“The Court's language 
strongly suggests an attempt to create a bright-line rule applicable in every 
state criminal court.”).  
82 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 210. 
83 Id. at 195. 
84 Id. at 195–96.  
85 Id. at 196. 
86 Id. at 197–98. 
87 Id. at 197. 
88 Id. at 198. 
89 Id. at 199. 
90 Id. at 203. 
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either a defendant’s first judicial appearance or an indictment.  
Prosecutorial knowledge is not necessary for the right to attach.  
The Rothgery court’s interpretation of the law was not new, 
however.91  Instead, it reinforced its stance on taking a bright-
line approach to when the right to counsel attaches and that 
the bright-line rule articulated in Gouveia and Kirby includes 
appearance before a judge to know whether there is probable 
cause and for a bail determination.92 
The disparity in outcomes under the status quo for those 
who can pay for an attorney and those who cannot must be 
considered.  If Rothgery could have afforded to retain an attorney 
who would have shown that the record was erroneous, his 
charges could have been dismissed before even appearing before 
a judge.  A lawyer could have entered into pre-indictment ne-
gotiations and resolved the issue or sought a disposition.  
Consider, in addition, the Turner scenario: Rothgery could have 
also been charged with a federal firearm crime and entered into 
plea negotiations with a federal prosecutor before an indictment.  
In this hypothetical situation, Rothgery’s state attorney could 
have misadvised him during the pre-indictment negotiations 
in his federal case, impacting the outcome of his federal case.  
Yet, according to Turner, he would be unable to bring an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.93 
 
E. The Supreme Court Has Not Directly Ruled on 
the Right to Counsel in Pre-Indictment Plea 
Negotiations   
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the right 
to counsel attaches to pre-indictment plea negotiations.94  
However, the bright-line rule applied in Gouveia, Kirby, and 
Rothgery implies that the right to counsel does not attach during 
pre-indictment plea negotiations because pre-indictment plea 
                                               
91 Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. 
L. REV. 333, 342 (2011) (“Rothgery’s specific holding of when the right to 
counsel attaches affirmed prior right to counsel rulings . . . .” (footnote omitted)).   
92 Kirby stated that “adversary judicial [criminal] proceedings” invoke 
the Sixth Amendment.  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).  
93 See Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 2018). 
94 See Mulroy, supra note 22. 
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negotiations happen before there is an indictment or a judicial 
proceeding.95  
For example, in United States v. Moody, the Sixth Circuit 
held that pre-indictment plea deals do not trigger the right to 
counsel.96  In Moody, Mark Moody voluntarily approached the 
FBI in order to cooperate on potential charges pertaining to a 
conspiracy to deal cocaine.97  At that point, an indictment had 
not been brought.98  The prosecution appreciated his cooperation 
and offered Moody a five-year-sentence plea offer.99  Moody hired 
an attorney who then declined the prosecution’s offer before 
realizing that the defendant made various self-incriminating 
statements during plea bargaining.100  The prosecutor used 
these statements and eventually forced the defendant to plead 
guilty, but at that point, the five-year sentence was off the table.  
Instead, the defendant pleaded guilty to a ten-year sentence.101  
Moody brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but 
the Sixth Circuit denied his claim.102  The Sixth Circuit under-
stood that it was a mere formality that the government had 
not filed an indictment before the plea offer, but declined to set 
aside, vacate, or correct the defendant’s sentence for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.103  Under the bright-line rule, the right 
to counsel did not attach and therefore, Moody did not have a 
right to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The right to 
counsel can only attach “at or after the initiation of judicial 
                                               
95 C.f. Turner, 885 F.3d 949. 
96 206 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that pre-indictment plea 
deals do not trigger the right to counsel). 
97 Id. at 611.  
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 612 (“The district court granted the motion for downward 
departure, and imposed a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment . . . .”).   
102 Id. at 615 (“But for the delay of the prosecution in filing charges, 
Moody clearly would have been entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.  
Under the Supreme Court’s and our Circuit’s approach, he is not—even though 
the point at which the actions of Moody’s counsel fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness was no less a ‘critical stage’ of the proceedings 
against him.”).  
103 Id. (“We believe it to be a mere formality that the government 
had not indicted Moody at the time that it offered him a deal and invited 
him to seek the assistance of counsel.”). 
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criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, pre-
liminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”104  
It ruled against Moody despite also stating that during pre-
indictment plea deals “the adverse positions of the government 
and the suspect have solidified” and the bright-line rule “raises 
the specter of the unwary defendant agreeing to surrender his 
right to a trial in exchange for an unfair sentence without the 
assurance of legal assistance to protect him.”105 
The Moody holding applied to the holding in Turner v. 
United States.106  The Sixth Circuit felt bound by Moody when 
it denied Turner relief.107  The court could not vacate or set aside 
the federal sentence because the state counsel’s ineffective per-
formance happened before any indictment or judicial proceeding 
in the federal case.108 
An Oregon district court, however, saw the issue differ-
ently in United States v. Wilson—it not only held that the 
right to counsel attached, but also awarded the defendant in-
effective assistance of counsel relief for advice during pre-
indictment plea negotiations.109  The defendant, Jay Wilson, 
was found with a large quantity of illegal drugs and a gun.110  
Before an indictment was filed, Wilson decided to cooperate 
with the authorities, confessed his role in a drug smuggling 
operation, and provided critical intelligence that led to more 
drug busts.111  He wanted to enter into pre-indictment plea 
negotiations, but the federal prosecutor insisted on an attorney 
                                               
104 Id. at 614 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).  
105 Id. at 615–16. 
106 Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018).  
107 Id. at 951–52. 
108 Id. at 955 (“There can be no constitutionally ineffective assistance 
of counsel where there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the first 
place.”). 
109 719 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (D. Or. 2010).  For a list of the split 
between courts on this issue, see Mulroy, supra note 22, at 216.  The circuit 
split Mulroy focuses on is not specific to pre-indictment plea deal negotiations, 
however, but rather examines whether the Supreme Court has implemented a 
bright-line rule or standard for any pre-indictment conduct. 
110 Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. 
111 Id.  
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being present.112  After the state provided Wilson an attorney, 
the prosecutor offered him a six-year plea deal.113  The public 
defender refused to accept the plea deal and instead countered 
that a deal be made after discovery.114  The prosecutor declined 
this offer and then filed an indictment.  At trial, Mr. Wilson 
was sentenced to twenty years in prison.115 
The defendant filed a motion to set aside or vacate his 
sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel based on his public 
defender’s advice pre-indictment,116  but the district court insisted 
that it legally needed to address whether the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attached.117  The district court first reiterated that 
the Supreme Court has not held whether the Sixth Amendment 
applies to “formal pre-indictment plea negotiation.”118  The court 
then took a more legal realist view of the issue: instead of 
drawing a bright line, the district court held that “the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel rests on the nature of the 
confrontation between the suspect-defendant and the government, 
rather than a ‘mechanical’ inquiry into whether the government 
has formally obtained an indictment.”119  It then found that the 
right to counsel had attached in this case.  The district court went 
on to review whether Wilson’s counsel was ineffective and had 
led to the twenty-year sentence.120 
The different outcomes in Wilson and Turner are sig-
nificant.121  Though both defendants had a lawyer pre-
indictment, only one defendant received relief for ineffective 
assistance of counsel—a corrected sentence of six years.  The 
                                               
112 Id. (“Petitioner insisted on speaking to the prosecutor about 
obtaining a ‘deal’ in exchange for his cooperation.  Assistant United States 
Attorney (‘AUSA’) Charles Stuckey informed him that [sic] would not 
discuss plea negotiations unless petitioner obtained an attorney.”).  
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1265. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 1266. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1269. 
121 Wilson, unlike Turner, did not deal with a state crime and then 
a subsequent federal charge.  This Note’s proposed solution, discussed in 
Part IV, does not make this distinction.  However, that difference is critical 
to understanding how indigent and minority defendants are more likely 
affected by the outcome, which is discussed in Part III.  
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other was denied a chance to argue that his counsel was 
ineffective because the Sixth Circuit held that the bright-line 
rule about when the right to counsel attaches precludes relief 
for ineffective assistance of counsel during pre-indictment plea 
negotiations, even when a lawyer was present during pre-
indictment proceedings.   
The issue is especially grave for indigent individuals 
who rely on appointed counsel and will most likely have different 
counsel if both state and federal prosecutors bring charges.  Until 
the Supreme Court rules on whether a criminal defendant can have 
relief for ineffective assistance of counsel during pre-indictment 
plea negotiations, an indigent defendant who has state-appointed 
counsel will be left without constitutional protections against a 
situation in which the state attorney gives advice that adversely 
affects the defendant’s federal case.   
 
III. TENSION BETWEEN THE CURRENT BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
FOR RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PROVIDING RELIEF FOR 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING PRE-
INDICTMENT PLEA NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE REMEDIED 
TO ADDRESS RACE AND CLASS ISSUES IN THE STATUS 
QUO 
The issue described does not need to exist; courts can 
provide ineffective assistance of counsel relief for advice received 
during pre-indictment plea negotiations without it being an 
affront to precedent or the text of the Constitution.  This becomes 
clearer if the right to effective assistance of counsel is analyzed 
as its own independent strand of the Sixth Amendment.  The 
Court stated in McMann v. Richardson that “if the right to 
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, 
defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, 
and that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of 
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in 
criminal cases in their courts.”122  This implies that courts must 
hold lawyers to their obligation to provide effective assistance 
of counsel, and no criminal defendant can be deprived of the 
ability to have effective assistance of counsel.  This makes sense 
given that the Sixth Amendment provides for “Assistance of 
                                               
122 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
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Counsel.”123  Strickland relied on McMann to hold that a de-
fendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel and then 
elaborated on what the standard is for measuring ineffective-
ness.124  Therefore, instead of depriving a criminal defendant 
of a constitutional right, courts must resolve the apparent 
tension between its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on right 
to counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel.   
Courts can do this by considering the administrative and 
fairness concerns the Supreme Court considers in the different 
Sixth Amendment strands and realizing that courts apply each 
strand independently based on the concerns the immediate 
case raises.  This tension must be resolved.  The criminal justice 
system relies on plea negotiations, and these negotiations can 
and do happen pre-indictment.125  Additionally, the facts of cases 
in which this issue is more likely to arise strongly influence how 
poor individuals and minorities are treated in the criminal 
justice system.  In these cases, a state brings charges, a state public 
attorney is assigned, and then federal prosecutors negotiate 
a plea with the state-appointed attorney before a federal in-
dictment is brought.126  Instead of viewing the negative impacts 
of pre-indictment plea negotiations as an innate, perennial issue, 
courts can provide relief that assists in remedying the pitfalls of 
the current system.  This Part analyzes how the courts can re-
solve the apparent tension between right to counsel attachment 
analysis and providing ineffective assistance of counsel relief for 
defendants who have a deficient attorney during pre-indictment 
plea negotiations.   
While the Supreme Court is preoccupied with ex ante 
clarity for right to counsel cases, that concern ought not to apply 
in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, as those claims 
are invariably assessed post-conviction.  Ineffective assistance 
                                               
123 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).  
124 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“The Court 
has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of 
effective assistance in the latter class of cases—that is, those presenting 
claims of ‘actual ineffectiveness.’ . . .  [But] [t]he benchmark for judging any 
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined 
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result.”).  
125 Mulroy, supra note 22, at 217.  
126 These were the facts in Turner, expect that there was not a state 
appointed attorney.  Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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of counsel issues cannot raise the same concerns as right to 
counsel issues because of the context in which they are raised, 
and because they guard against different injustices.  The 
differences between ineffective assistance of counsel and right 
to counsel create tension and should be viewed as legal fiction.  
Courts should provide relief for harmful legal advice obtained 
during pre-indictment plea negotiations.   
Additionally, this Part analyzes why this tension must 
be resolved.  Given the way poor and minority defendants in-
teract with the criminal justice system, this tension denies 
relief to many and perpetuates the disparities that plague the 
criminal justice system.  The courts should consider this impact 
and understand the policy concerns the current supposed 
tension raises.   
 
A. The Necessity of Ex Ante Clarification of Current 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Cases  
A bright-line rule is a meaningful way to address the 
fairness and administrative concerns the Supreme Court has 
when reviewing when the right to counsel constitutionally 
attaches.  The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel precedent 
developed out of a need to protect the lay defendant, and this 
necessity underpins all of the Court’s right to counsel opinions.127  
For instance, Gideon compelled states to provide counsel for 
all criminal defendants, not just in capital cases.  This is because 
an attorney can help provide a fair criminal procedure in the 
adversarial system and a fair criminal system goes beyond 
capital crimes.128  The Court emphasized the importance of 
having the right to an attorney when it stated that “[e]ven the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no 
skill in the science of law.”129  Lay defendants need protection, 
                                               
127 Some scholars believe the right to counsel developed not just to 
protect lay defendants, but specifically because of the courts’ paternalistic 
nature and desire to protect African Americans, who were seen as inherently 
lay defendants.  See generally Kristen Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the 
Right to Counsel, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (2017).  Others directly relate the 
concern to protect the lay defendant with the history of the right pre-
Constitution.  See Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary 
Right-To-Counsel Doctrine, 93 NW. L. REV. 1635, 1637–57 (2003).  
128 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  
129 Id. at 345. 
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and the Court believed that this is the pivotal role attorneys play 
within the adversarial system.   
Requiring counsel to be provided is not enough to protect 
the lay defendant.  Courts must decide when in the proceedings 
an attorney must be provided.  In Gouveia, the Court articulated 
that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment was to “protect[] the 
unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary.”130  
The Court wants the criminal process to be perceived as fair.  
A process that allows a prosecutor who is well-versed in the law 
to begin prosecuting someone without an attorney does not have 
a perception of fairness.   
These fairness concerns galvanized the Court to apply 
a bright-line rule for determining when the right to counsel 
attaches.  In order to protect lay defendants in adversarial 
criminal proceedings, ex ante clarity is necessary.  This clarity 
is precisely what a bright-line rule provides.  Looking retro-
spectively is not good enough because it leaves defendants on 
their own to answer complex legal questions that can impact 
their outcomes.131  There can be remedies after the fact, but 
sometimes remedies are hard to provide—it is difficult to know 
what would have been different if a lawyer was present.  Instead 
of conjecturing about this, the Court unequivocally states when 
in the process the defendant must have an attorney.   
Right to counsel cases also have administrative concerns 
that support the need for ex ante clarity and therefore, a need for a 
bright-line rule.  First, generally, if a state has an obligation to 
provide counsel in a far-ranging number of cases after Gideon and 
Argersinger, then the Court must be clear about when the state 
must provide this benefit.  The Court cannot reasonably expect 
a state to determine when to provide counsel on a case-by-case 
standard with fair results.132  Secondly, and similarly, right to 
counsel law should not be allowed to impede a state’s routine 
investigation techniques that help ensure the correct defendant 
                                               
130 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984); see also 
Rothgery v. Gillespie, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (discussing when the right 
to counsel attaches and why it does). 
131 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (stating that a lay defendant needs help 
in the “science of law”) (emphasis added).  
132 Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 19 
(2016) (arguing that Gideon has been a failed promise and is consistently 
undermined by underfunding and overworking public defender offices and 
by “legislators, taxpayers, and lower-level judges nationwide”).  
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is arrested.133  A standard-based approach to the attachment 
analysis would essentially cause prosecutors to have minitrials 
while investigating a matter before an indictment is brought to 
show that their actions were not “adversarial” in nature.134  A 
bright-line rule eliminates this concern. 
The Court has historically been concerned about these 
administrative problems when reviewing pre-indictment line-
ups.135  In United States v. Kirby, the Court saw that the de-
fendant was asking the Court “to import into a routine police 
investigation an absolute constitutional guarantee historically 
and rationally applicable only after the onset of formal prose-
cutorial proceedings.”136  The Court stated that it enforces a 
different doctrine to ensure there is no abuse during investi-
gations, but the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not 
suitable.137  Ex ante clarity ensures that the state knows how 
it can conduct routine lineups, and the same can be said for 
pre-indictment investigations.  The current bright-line rule is 
manageable and allows courts to guard against their admin-
istrative concerns.  The Court, therefore, relies on other doc-
trines and promulgated rules by the American Bar Association 
to ensure investigations are conducted in a fair manner.  
However, it denies that the Sixth Amendment provides doctrinal 
use.138  
                                               
133 In fact, there are clear ethical rules showing that courts desire 
to protect routine investigation techniques while ethically regulating adver-
sarial prosecutor contact.  For further examples of the Court’s concern with 
impeding investigations outside the context of this Note, see Lisa F. Salvatore, 
United States v. Hammad: Encouraging Ethical Conduct of Prosecutors 
During Pre-Indictment Investigations, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 577 (discussing 
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) and how the Court became wary about applying 
it to pre-indictment investigations).  
134 The adversarial language is used here as a standard to mirror 
the law stated in lower courts, which apply a standard-like approach.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (D. Or. 2010).   
135 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).  
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 691 (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive 
to irreparable mistaken identification.”).  
138 Id. (holding that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to routine 
police investigations but that this does “not . . . suggest that there may not 
be occasions during the course of a criminal investigation when the police 
do abuse identification procedures[;] [s]uch abuses are not beyond the reach 
of the Constitution”). 
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B. Courts Do Not Need Ex Ante Clarity When 
Giving Defendants Relief Under the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel  
A bright-line rule is unnecessary because the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is not 
a ground rule establishing fair parameters at the start of legal 
proceedings.  Instead, this guarantee is supposed to correct 
mishaps that happen during the pursuit of justice.  Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims innately present a different problem 
than the right to counsel attachment analysis.  Courts should, 
therefore, deal with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
differently than, and separately from, the attachment analysis.   
Ineffective assistance of counsel is retrospective—no ex 
ante clarity is necessary.  This is because ineffective assistance 
of counsel does not become a problem until conviction.  This 
would be true for pre-indictment ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims as well.  It is not about setting rules beforehand, but 
more like bringing a gun to a gun fight when the gun’s trigger 
malfunctions, causing a fatal ending for the defendant.  So, 
though courts are concerned with ex ante clarity for right to 
counsel cases, courts cannot and do not need to have the same 
concerns when providing relief for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
To claim that one’s right to effective assistance of counsel 
was violated, a defendant is required to show that (1) there is 
a deficient performance by counsel and (2) the deficiency prej-
udiced the defendant.139  The standard implies that the right 
can only be reviewed retrospectively and is factually dependent.  
The reviewing court is not permitted to conjecture whether 
counsel will be defective and prejudice the defendant.  The fact 
that there needs to be retrospective review is simply a byproduct 
of what the claim is supposed to protect and rectify. 
Significant consideration must be paid to the different 
contexts in which the right to counsel and ineffective assistance 
of counsel strands of the Sixth Amendment arise in order to 
understand the different administrative concerns.  Most right 
to counsel claims are brought to suppress evidence and so are 
                                               
139 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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raised before conviction and sometimes before trial.140  For 
example, a lineup that happens post-indictment without a 
lawyer present cannot be introduced at trial.141 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims, instead, are 
usually brought only after the defendant loses his or her case.  
First, defendants cannot raise the claim in most state proceedings 
until collateral review or in federal habeas claims.142  Second, if 
the defendant is not convicted, then the deficient performance 
becomes moot.  Proving prejudice becomes insurmountable when 
a defendant is acquitted.  The prejudice prong is easier to review 
when a defendant is convicted because a court is reviewing 
specific action taken by counsel already present and its impact 
on the adverse outcome.  Moreover, no matter what concerns a 
court may have about the effectiveness of counsel, the concerns 
are inconsequential if the defendant is not convicted.  In fact, the 
sole concern the Court addresses in Strickland is that courts can 
only review whether counsel was deficient with the benefit of 
hindsight, and the Court clearly stated that performance must 
be viewed from the lens of counsel’s perspective at the time.143  
 
                                               
140 See Beth G. Hungate-Noland, Texas v. Cobb: A Narrow Road 
Ahead for the Sixth Amendment, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1191 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of the 
right to counsel).  
141 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that the 
use of a post-indictment lineup violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right and could not be used at trial, but remanding for review the issue of 
the admissibility of an in-court identification by the same witness).  
142 See generally Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in 
Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007) (arguing that only allowing a defendant to raise 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a collateral review hearing is 
inadequate); see also Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After 
Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2604 (2013) (reviewing the effect of a Supreme Court case that allowed 
for ineffective assistance of counsel in state court to be raised in federal 
habeas claims).  
143 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
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1. The Supreme Court Has Adopted 
Retrospective Review in Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims Under 
the Sixth Amendment Within the Plea 
Negotiation Context, Illustrating the 
Necessity of Applying This Approach to 
Plea Negotiations 
The court needs to adopt retrospective review of inef-
fective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining for similar 
reasons.  The problem of ineffective assistance of counsel is not 
an issue until a plea deal is reached and entered.  Furthermore, 
and significantly, there are no ex post concerns because the 
remedy afforded for deficient plea negotiation advice does its 
best to rectify the prejudice the defendant received.   
The Supreme Court has accepted ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims pertaining to advice given during post-indictment 
plea negotiations.144  Hill v. Lockhart is the first example of this.  
The Hill court was forced to apply an inherently retrospective 
standard.  Hill’s court-appointed attorney negotiated a plea deal 
in which the prosecutor would recommend a thirty-five-year 
sentence to be served concurrently and the judge accepted both 
the plea and the sentence recommendation.145  This negotiation 
appeared seamless until Hill was informed that because he was 
a formerly convicted felon, he must serve one-half of his sentence 
to become eligible for parole compared to the one-third he was 
told he would need to serve by his attorney.146  Hill’s counsel 
wrongly advised Hill about this issue, and Hill then claimed 
                                               
144 This was done in a string of cases.  See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 
156 (2012) (holding that Cooper was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 
performance after rejecting a guilty plea); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 
145 (2012)  (holding that “defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal 
offers from the prosecution” and that as a result, counsel was deficient in failing 
to communicate to defendant prosecutor’s written plea before it expired); Hill 
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (holding in part that the Strickland v. 
Washington test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
applies to guilty plea challenges based on ineffective assistance of counsel). 
145 Hill, 474 U.S. at 54 (“The trial judge accepted the guilty plea 
and sentenced petitioner in accordance with the State’s recommendations.”). 
146 Id.   
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ineffective assistance of counsel.147  The Hill court held that the 
standard was not just proving counsel was deficient, but that 
a defendant would need to show he would have foregone accept-
ing the plea and gone to trial but for the deficient perfor-
mance148—a standard that requires review only post-plea 
deal.149  The Supreme Court’s acceptance of retrospective review 
within the plea context is true for plea deals that are not accepted 
as well.  Indeed, this was the case in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri 
v. Frye.150  The Court can, therefore, readily apply retrospective 
review to pre-indictment plea negotiations.  
The Court applies the same Strickland analysis when 
reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims when a 
defendant pleads that his counsel’s deficient performance led to 
a lapse or denial of a plea deal.151  As previously noted, what is 
particularly interesting about the precedent within this 
specific context is the remedy courts may impose.  That is, courts 
can essentially compel the state to reoffer the plea deal.152  This 
remedy is extraordinary.  It fixes any issues with the defective 
counsel by providing what would have been the outcome if not 
for defense counsel’s prejudicial performance.  Remedies for right 
to counsel do not provide this fix.  Instead, they simply remand 
for a new trial without knowing what the outcome would have 
been.  This available remedy cannot adequately address the issue 
of a lay defendant facing a prosecutor alone, no matter how 
responsible and ethical the prosecutor.  Instead of clarifying 
when a lawyer must be present, a court reviewing ineffective 
assistance of counsel can use a case-by-case basis to look for 
                                               
147 Id. at 55 (“According to petitioner, his attorney had told him that 
if he pleaded guilty he would become eligible for parole after serving one-
third of his prison sentence.  In fact, because petitioner previously had been 
convicted of a felony in Florida, he was classified under Arkansas law as a 
‘second offender’ and was required to serve one-half of his sentence before 
becoming eligible for parole.”). 
148 Id. at 59–60.  
149 This Note is not discussing conflict of interest claims, which are 
brought under the Sixth Amendment effective assistance of counsel strand.  
150 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (holding that Cooper was 
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance after rejecting a guilty plea); 
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that “defense counsel 
has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution” and that as a 
result, counsel was deficient in failing to communicate to defendant prosecutor’s 
written plea before it expired).  
151 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
152 Lafler, 566 U.S. at 166. 
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the lapse or denial of a plea offer and offer a just remedy.  This 
is an appropriate remedy even when the defendant had a full 
trial.153  
Understanding the significance of plea deals in the 
criminal justice system, the Court decided to extend ineffective 
assistance of counsel protections to post-indictment plea 
negotiations.154  The nature of these claims force retrospective 
review, making any right to counsel attachment analysis 
irrelevant, and the remedies provided make any ex ante 
concerns moot.  This analysis can be extended to pre-indictment 
negotiations.  Post-indictment negotiations are not different 
than pre-indictment negotiations, except for the mere formality 
of an indictment.  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims for 
post-indictment are analyzed retrospectively.  This analysis 
can be easily applied to pre-indictment plea deal negotiations.  
Courts would still be asked to review pre-indictment plea 
negotiations post-conviction—the ill-advice provided pre-
indictment would still drive post-indictment outcomes.  There 
is nothing inherent to pre-indictment plea negotiations that 
make their review for deficient counsel different than that of 
negotiations detached from right to counsel in the post-
indictment context.   
 
C. The Significance of Retrospective Review in 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: 
Different Strands and Applications of the Sixth 
Amendment  
The fact that the Court applies a retrospective analysis 
detached from a right to counsel analysis is significant because 
it indicates that the Court applies the strands of the Sixth 
Amendment differently according to the concerns each raises.  
The Sixth Amendment provides that in “all criminal prosecu-
tions” a defendant will “have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense.”155  The Supreme Court has articulated three different 
rights that are inherent in the right to have “Assistance of 
Counsel”: (1) the right to an attorney, including the right to 
publicly appointed counsel; (2) the right to effective assistance 
                                               
153 Id. at 174. 
154 Frye, 566 U.S. at 143 (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions 
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).  
155 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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of counsel; and (3) the right to counsel of one’s choice.156  Thus, 
ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed as an independent 
strand of the Sixth Amendment.  
The Supreme Court created a distinction between dif-
ferent strands of the Sixth Amendment in United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez.157  Gonzalez-Lopez concerned the Sixth 
Amendment’s promise that a criminal defendant has not just 
the right to counsel, but a right to counsel of one’s choice.158  
Gonzalez-Lopez was charged with conspiracy to distribute 
marijuana and tried to replace the attorney his family hired 
with an attorney of his own.159  This attorney applied for 
admission pro hac vice three times, but the district court denied 
him the ability to represent Gonzalez-Lopez each time.160  The 
Eighth Circuit found that the district court erroneously deprived 
Gonzalez-Lopez of the counsel of his choice and vacated the 
conviction.161 
The Supreme Court upheld the Eighth Circuit’s order, 
but Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the Court, took pains 
to explain that the right to counsel and the right to counsel of 
one’s choice are different strands of the Sixth Amendment that 
are distinct from the right to effective assistance of counsel.162  
The government argued that a defendant who claims he was 
deprived of the right to counsel of his choice should not obtain 
a remedy unless he can show that his actual attorney was 
ineffective.163  The Court, however, stated that erroneous 
deprivation of counsel bears directly on the framework within 
                                               
156 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (holding 
that the right to counsel includes the right to counsel of one’s choice); 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (discussing the right to effective assistance of 
counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (discussing the 
right to counsel in criminal proceedings).  
157 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (holding that the defendant not 
only had the right to counsel but also a right to counsel of his choosing). 
158 Id. at 144; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense.”). 
159 Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142.  
160 Id. at 142–43 (finding that the district court not only denied Low 
the ability to represent the defendant, but issued sanctions against him).  
161 Id. at 143.  
162 Id. at 147 (“The right to select counsel of one’s choice, by contrast, 
has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a 
fair trial.”). 
163 Id. at 144.  
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which trial proceeds.164  It is impossible to know how the trial 
would have proceeded if conducted by entirely different counsel, 
similar to ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Court then 
highlighted that the right to counsel of one’s choice raises 
different concerns than effective assistance of counsel.165  With 
these concerns in mind, the right to counsel of one’s choice 
does not require a “prejudice inquiry.”166  The Court granted 
the defendant a new trial without deciding if the defendant 
was prejudiced by not being represented by his counsel of 
choice.167  The facts of this case show the different administrative 
and justice concerns the Court has in dividing the different kinds 
of relief under the Sixth Amendment.168  
Lower courts have also divided the right to counsel from 
the right to effective assistance of counsel.169  In a class action 
case brought by previously convicted defendants against the 
State of New York, for example, defendants claimed that their 
Sixth Amendment rights were violated and sought to overhaul 
the state’s public defense system.170  At the time of their ar-
raignment, the class members had not been appointed an 
attorney, nor did they have an attorney at “subsequent pro-
ceedings.”171  Some went unrepresented for five or more 
months.172  Additionally, some defendants could never contact 
their attorney and had various motions and waivers filed on 
their behalf without being informed or consenting.173  The claim 
was filed post-conviction, so the trial court found the claim to 
be a violation of their right to effective assistance of counsel.  The 
court found the systemic relief sought inapplicable and denied 
the claim.174  
                                               
164 Id. at 148. 
165 Id. at 144.  
166 Id. at 148.  
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 144.  
169 See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010). 
170 Id. at 219.  
171 Id. at 222.  
172 Id. (finding that this general issue was true for ten out of the 
twenty plaintiffs).  
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 220. 
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The New York Court of Appeals construed the complaint 
as claiming that New York violated plaintiffs’ right to counsel.175  
First, the court summarized the different strands of the Sixth 
Amendment and how each raised different concerns to provide 
different relief.176  The court then found this claim wholly 
different from effective assistance of counsel, both in the nature 
and the type of relief that can be granted.177  The court stated 
that “[g]iven the simplicity and autonomy of a claim for non-
representation, as opposed to one truly involving the adequacy 
of an attorney’s performance, there is no reason . . . why such 
a claim cannot or should not be brought without the context of 
a completed prosecution.”178  The court then construed the claim 
as one for a violation of a right to counsel rather than one for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.179  This may have been moti-
vated by the clarity of applying the bright-line rule under the 
right to counsel law.180 
Hurrell-Harring and Gonzalez-Lopez illustrate the legal 
fiction that the Sixth Circuit relies on in Turner v. United 
States.  Courts can separate the different strands of the Sixth 
Amendment and provide relief depending on which strand is 
violated.  While dicta in Gonzalez-Lopez supports this claim, 
Hurrell-Harring is an example of a court providing relief 
under the Sixth Amendment based on the facts of the case and 
the different concerns under the different Sixth Amendment 
strands.  The New York Court of Appeals separated strands of 
the Sixth Amendment according to different concerns.  The 
variance of concerns with regard to ineffective assistance of 
counsel attachment highlight why the Sixth Amendment tension 
in reviewing pre-indictment plea deals should be eradicated.  
The Court should not deprive a defendant of the effective as-
sistance of counsel strand of the Sixth Amendment when the 
concerns it wants to guard against are present.  By under-
standing that the concerns regarding ineffective representation 
                                               
175 Id. at 222 (“The above summarized allegations, in our view, state 
cognizable Sixth Amendment claims.”).  
176 Id. at 221–22.  
177 Id. at 225–26.  
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 222–24. (“These allegations state a claim, not for ineffective 
assistance under Strickland, but for basic denial of the right to counsel 
under Gideon.”).  
180 See id. at 225 (noting that analysis of the right to counsel is not 
a fact-intensive inquiry).  
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in pre-indictment plea negotiations are the same as for post-
indictment plea negotiations, courts can afford to give ineffective 
assistance of counsel relief within this context.    
 
D. The Court Should Be Wary of the Impact of the 
Current Tension Between the Attachment of 
the Right to Counsel and Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Pre-Indictment on Poor People and 
Minorities   
In addition to recognizing that it can justify applying a 
strand of the Sixth Amendment and extend Sixth Amendment 
relief to pre-indictment plea negotiations based on different 
administrative concerns, the Supreme Court should also con-
sider the impact the current lack of protection has on poor and 
minority communities.181  The facts of Turner indicate the 
circumstances under which this problem is more likely to arise.   
Consider a scenario expanding on the facts in Turner: 
an indigent defendant is investigated and indicted on a state 
aggravated robbery charge.  She is appointed a state public 
defense attorney who begins to create a defense for her trial.  
The state eventually passes the case on to federal prosecutors, 
and so additional federal charges based on the same conduct 
may potentially be filed, but no indictment is filed yet.  The 
federal prosecutor decides to reach out to the state-appointed 
attorney to discuss plea negotiations pre-indictment.  Mean-
while, the state attorney is working hard on the defendant’s 
case, but the attorney is overworked, as is often the case, with 
a caseload straining the attorney’s means and resources.  The 
state-appointed attorney fails to communicate the plea nego-
tiations—which resulted in a fifteen-year plea deal offer—to 
the defendant.  This deficient counsel effectively seals the 
defendant’s fate in the federal charges.  After she gets indicted 
on the federal crime, the defendant is appointed a federal 
                                               
181 For additional arguments for extending the Sixth Amendment 
to the pre-indictment context, see Mulroy, supra note 22 (arguing that the 
Court’s language in its opinions offer up an ability to extend the Sixth 
Amendment to pre-indictment situations, and that fairness requires extending 
the Sixth Amendment).  See generally Breslow, supra note 41 (arguing that 
the Court’s dicta gives way for extending the Sixth Amendment specifically 
to pre-indictment plea bargaining).  
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defense attorney.182  The federal prosecutor decides to take the 
original, more lenient pre-indictment plea deal off the table.  
The new, and perhaps better, attorney cannot fix what the 
previous attorney did.  The defendant eventually accepts a plea 
deal of twenty-five years.183  The advice from the first attorney 
prejudiced her outcome, but the defendant probably does not 
have a claim; she did not have a right to counsel in her federal 
case and therefore had no right to effective assistance of counsel 
pre-indictment.   
This situation—an indigent defendant undergoing state 
proceedings and a state-appointed public defender and then 
subsequent federal charges with a change of representation—
is not merely hypothetical.184  Though it affects a limited class 
of people (and the right to counsel is a more widespread issue), 
the injustice in pre-indictment proceedings still exists and will 
continue to exist unless addressed.  It is well-documented that 
federal law has criminalized many acts that used to be solely 
                                               
182 Because the state public attorney system is funded and operated 
differently than the federal public defense system, the defendant most likely 
will need a different attorney for each case.  See WOLF HARLOW, supra note 16, 
at 3. 
183 This was the case in Turner v. United States, 848 F.3d 767 (6th 
Cir. 2018).  
184 See, e.g., Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State 
Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 
30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 240 (2005) (recounting a criminal defendant 
who could have been prosecuted in state court but was instead prosecuted 
in federal court and arguing that this scenario is an outgrowth from state-
federal prosecutor cooperation); Michael M. O'Hear, National Uniformity/Local 
Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State 
Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721 (2002) (recounting that two 
criminal defendants were charged with the same crime, but federal prosecutors 
dropped the charges on one because of state court proceedings yet continued 
prosecuting the other, which led to the former defendant receiving probation 
and the latter receiving thirteen months in prison).  
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state crimes.185  There is a large (and growing) amount of 
criminal conduct that can expose a defendant to two different 
criminal trials—state and federal.  This over-federalization also 
increases the likelihood of Turner outcomes. 
In fact, cases similar to Turner—state trial and subse-
quent federal charges—are not difficult to find.186  What is 
more concerning is that there is an increasing amount of 
cooperation between federal and state prosecutors, especially 
because federal sentences are harsher.187  This will only create 
more cases with facts like Turner and leave indigent defendants 
without Sixth Amendment relief when there is a possibility 
they will need it.  In fact, “90 to 95 percent of [public defenders’] 
clients plead guilty.”188  Further, this plea negotiating is not 
limited to post-indictment negotiations.189  The current climate 
is ripe for indigent defendants to face Turner situations.  Unfor-
tunately, the unfairness in the current system also falls 
unevenly along racial lines. 
 
1. Racial Implications 
The racial fabric of the criminal justice tapestry is pro-
found, and excluding Sixth Amendment relief from pre-indict-
ment plea negotiations serves to perpetuate this systemic 
                                               
185 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to 
Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS 
L.J. 979, 980 (1995) (proposing a principle for how to limit federalization); 
Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 
S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 647 (1997) (“As a result of the growth of federal criminal 
law, much criminal conduct is now subject to federal as well as state 
prosecution.”); Michael A. Simmons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution 
Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
893, 897 (2000) (“There is no doubt that many federal criminal statutes 
cover conduct that is usually (and has traditionally been) prosecuted by state 
and local authorities.”). 
186 See Miller & Eisenstein, supra note 184.  
187 Id. (arguing that federal-state prosecution cooperation is growing 
considerably).  
188 Lee et al., supra note 21.  
189 See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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issue.190  Scholarship on the significant racial disparities is 
plentiful.191  For instance, one study found that “African 
Americans are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate that is 
5.1 times the imprisonment of [W]hites.”192 Another study found 
that  
 
[i]n 2014, African Americans constituted 2.3 
million (34 percent) of the total 6.8 million 
prison population in the U.S. . . . and although 
African Americans and Hispanics made up ap-
proximately 32 percent of the U.S.  population, 
they comprised 56 percent of all incarcerated 
people in the U.S. in 2015.193   
 
This disparity exists in a world where plea deals are the usual 
disposition of a case, pre-indictment plea deals included.   
Studies demonstrate that African American defendants 
are not only forced into more plea bargains, but they receive 
harsher plea deals.  One study, for example, examined racial 
disparities in the plea-bargaining process in Wisconsin and found 
startling results:   
 
White defendants are twenty-five percent more 
likely than [B]lack defendants to have their 
most serious initial charge dropped or reduced 
to a less severe charge . . . .  As a result, [W]hite 
defendants who face initial felony charges are 
approximately fifteen percent more likely than 
[B]lack defendants to end up being convicted of 
                                               
190 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010) (“[M]ass incarceration 
operates as a tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs, and 
institutions that operate collectively to ensure the subordinate status of a 
group defined largely by race.”). 
191 See, e.g., JESSICA EAGLIN & DANYELLE SOLOMON, REDUCING RACIAL 
AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE 13 
(2015) (“[Nationally,] African Americans and Hispanics are significantly 
overrepresented in jails.”). 
192 ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (2016), https://www.senten 
cingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-
Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD6D-6QQN] (citing 
statistics from the Bureau of Justice).  
193 Michael Kiehne, Why Diversity Still Matters, 96 MICH. BAR J. 22, 
24 (2017) (footnote omitted).  
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a misdemeanor instead.  In addition, [W]hite 
defendants initially charged with misdemeanors 
are approximately seventy-five percent more 
likely than [B[lack defendants to be convicted 
for crimes carrying no possible incarceration, or 
not to be convicted at all.194 
 
Wisconsin is not an outlier.  In New York City, African American 
defendants are nineteen percent more likely to be offered a 
plea deal that includes jail or prison time; the disparity is even 
more significant for misdemeanor drug offenses.195  Further-
more, the racial disparities in outcomes exist in a context in 
which African Americans are more likely to rely on a public 
defender in felony cases than White defendants.196   
These statistics have grave implications.  First, African 
Americans are more prone to Turner situations.  With the increased 
federalization of crime, Turner situations are not only made 
more likely, but there is also a reasonable assumption that these 
situations will likely fall along the current racial lines in the 
criminal justice system.  The federalization of crimes is not im-
plemented in a way that will stop the current systemic racial 
injustice.  Second, Turner situations can be seen as exacerbating 
the racial disparities in plea outcomes.  Given that African 
Americans face harsher plea deals, there is no reason to think 
that the harsher plea deals happen only post-indictment.197  
Therefore, it is likely that these disparities will happen pre-
indictment and could be the result of ineffective assistance of 
counsel—Turner received a sentence that was ten years longer 
                                               
194 Berdejó, supra note 24, at 1191 (footnotes omitted). 
195 BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RACE AND 
PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 7 (2014), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files 
/resources/downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-research-summary-
v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRR2-ZZWE].  
196  CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & LINH VUONG, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME 
& DELINQUENCY, CREATED EQUAL: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE US 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 14 (2009).  In 2009, for example, it was found to 
be 4.7 times more likely.  Id.  
197 There is very little data on the nature of plea deals and what 
offers were rejected or when in the criminal proceeding the plea was offered.  
See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE 
IT 16 (2018), https://bit.ly/2M9qIr1 [https://perma.cc/L29B-QZK6] (finding that 
data about plea offers is largely unavailable “[b]ecause plea negotiations are 
off the record and because most cases plead out”). 
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than what he would have received with effective counsel.  
Currently, when poor African American defendants are placed 
in a Turner situation, they are not afforded a remedy after their 
attorney gives bad advice that leads to a high likelihood of a 
harsher plea deal.  Affording relief for ineffective assistance of 
counsel during pre-indictment plea negotiations is a way for 
courts to begin to rectify this racial injustice, allowing African 
American defendants to at least gain some sort of relief when 
their counsel’s ineffective advice leads to a disproportionate 
plea deal. 
 
IV. EXTENDING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The Court should give a defendant the right to effective 
assistance of counsel whenever a prosecutor enters into pre-
indictment plea negotiations and a defendant is represented in 
some capacity.198  This proposed rule provides an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim for all defendants who need it; if a 
defendant has an attorney in any capacity (for example, she has 
a state attorney pre-indictment for any potential charges), she 
has the right to effective assistance of counsel.  The solution 
resolves the current Sixth Amendment tension based on the 
above administrative concerns with an eye toward the current 
injustice forced upon the indigent and racial minorities. 
Any of the existing remedies already offered for inef-
fective assistance of counsel within the plea context could be 
the remedy provided for ineffective assistance pre-indictment.  
Indeed, when deficient counsel results in a defendant accepting 
a less desirable plea, a court can control the remedy by vacating 
the plea and ordering the parties to renegotiate or go to trial.199  
If the ineffective counsel fails to inform the defendant or leads 
the defendant to reject a favorable plea, lower courts have more 
discretion, depending on whether the plea led to a harsher 
sentence or a harsher charge.  If it is the former, then a court 
can simply impose a new sentence reflecting the original plea; 
                                               
198 A similar rule was proposed before but was broader in scope, 
focused on the right to counsel, and included interrogations by a prosecutor 
as well.  See Mulroy, supra note 22, at 241–42 (proposing extending the right 
to counsel when considering the potential arbitrariness in courts’ opinions 
when implementing the current bright-line rule). 
199 See Lee v. United States, 137 U.S. 1958, 1969 (2017) (vacating 
the plea deal and therefore requiring prosecutors to renegotiate).  
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if it is the latter, then a court can require the prosecutor to reoffer 
the original plea with the lesser charge.200  The remedies for 
these claims already exist and should be applied to the pre-
indictment plea negotiation context as well.   
 
A. The Proposed Rule Is Not an Affront to the 
Concerns Raised for Right to Counsel in Pre-
Indictment Contexts 
The rule is not an affront to ex ante clarity concerns 
raised in right to counsel cases.  First, ex ante concerns are not 
relevant when analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  They pose different problems than the right to counsel, 
and so the current friction ought not to exist and a remedy 
should be afforded.  Second, there is still a clear, bright-line 
rule for when the relief should be available.  Prosecutors and 
courts will know beforehand whether a defendant can seek 
relief based on an accepted plea deal or a plea deal that lapsed.  
There is no ambiguity in the specificity of the proposed extension 
of the Sixth Amendment.   
Significantly, the proposed rule is also workable for 
states.  The rule does “not require that the state actually furnish 
counsel any earlier in the process than it currently does.”201  
Instead, the rule allows prosecutors and defense counsel to 
face the same consequences they would face for their actions 
within a specific context without regard to whether a charge 
has been brought or not.  It also eliminates any incentive for 
prosecutors to use their leverage when a defendant is most 
vulnerable and eliminates incentives to delay a formal charge.202  
Furthermore, the Court would not be interfering with 
ubiquitous investigation tactics.  To be clear, this Note is not 
concerned with police conduct; it instead focuses on the injustice 
that prosecutors may engage in pre-indictment plea negotiations 
with defense attorneys who may fail to give effective counsel, 
while affected defendants are not provided constitutional 
                                               
200 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170–71 (2012). 
201 Mulroy, supra note 22, at 242 (citing Colbert, supra note 91, at 
334 (finding that states continue to delay when they appoint counsel despite 
the Court’s ruling in Rothgery)).   
202 See Mulroy, supra note 22, at 247.  
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protection and thus are not provided relief.203  Once a prosecutor 
enters the picture and begins plea negotiations, one might 
assume that there is already damning evidence against the 
defendant.  Defense counsel must not be able to escape her 
ineffectiveness and leave a defendant ill-informed of her options 
and chances at trial.  As shown, the Court considers how it will 
interfere with daily investigation tactics when reviewing pre-
indictment Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases.  Yet, once 
a prosecutor enters plea negotiations, this concern should be 
moot because ideally, if a prosecutor is offering a plea, the 
investigation should have already produced convincing evidence.   
Pre-indictment plea negotiations are no different, ad-
ministratively, from when courts review whether counsel was 
ineffective or not during post-indictment plea negotiations.  
The Court must, and does, look retroactively at whether counsel 
was deficient within the latter context, and so it should not be 
concerned in doing so for pre-indictment plea negotiations.  
Essentially, no new law is being created.  Courts already know 
how to analyze the claim.204 
 
B. The Proposed Rule Is Not an Affront to Sixth 
Amendment Precedent 
The previous discussion shows that courts consistently 
separate the different strands of the Sixth Amendment and 
consider the different administrative issues each strand poses.  
More importantly, courts will apply the Sixth Amendment 
strands differently based on these divergent administrative 
concerns and the particular administrative issues a case 
raises.  Courts have even gone as far as construing a complaint 
to fit within this framework and therefore finding a complaint 
judicially cognizable.205 
                                               
203 Relief depends only on whether the plea was done voluntarily, 
knowingly, and with a factual basis.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).  It can be argued 
that pre-indictment plea deals violate this rule, but that argument most 
likely fails.  
204 The courts have decided to entertain ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims during plea bargaining, and this Note does not argue that 
ineffective assistance of counsel during pre-indictment plea bargaining is 
different than the claims courts review now.  See, e.g., Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162–
63. 
205 Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 222 (N.Y. 2010). 
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Therefore, applying Sixth Amendment ineffective as-
sistance of counsel relief to pre-indictment plea negotiations 
does not undercut precedent in other pre-indictment contexts.  
Providing this constitutional relief instead would help address 
the Court’s overall fairness concern in most Sixth Amendment 
cases—protecting the lay defendant.  Lay defendants, who are 
often poor and African American, with deficient counsel should 
not have to wait until a formal charge is brought to have relief 
for the unfairness they faced, especially when plea bargaining 
dominates the criminal justice system.206  In fact, if the Court 
does not extend Sixth Amendment relief, the concerns the Court 
addresses with a bright-line rule in right to counsel cases become 
arbitrary.   
 
C. Extending Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Protects Indigent Individuals and Racial 
Minorities and Creates a More Fair and Just 
Criminal Justice System 
Current law threatens the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system because it leaves poor, African American de-
fendants without constitutional protections in a context where 
they most need them.  Extending the Sixth Amendment to pre-
indictment plea negotiations can be another tool in improving 
the criminal justice system in order to ensure that the system 
is not taking advantage of indigent, African American defend-
ants.  Though the rule would also benefit wealthy defendants, 
it would not allow wealthy defendants to guard against routine 
investigation tactics; lineups and interrogations can still be 
conducted as they always have been.  Yet, when a federal 
prosecutor begins to alter the availability of the best outcome 
for rich and poor defendants with pending state charges, poor, 
African American defendants will now not have to wait to 
have the right to counsel and appointed counsel in the federal 
charge to gain relief if later advice leads to a harsher plea deal 
or they are left without a plea deal at all.  The Court will not 
just be protecting indigent defendants, but can judicially help 
address an issue that plagues society today—racial discrimi-
nation in the criminal justice system.  There are positive policy 
implications when the right to counsel is extended to pre-
indictment plea deals. 
                                               
206 Lee et al., supra note 21.  
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D. Limitations to the Proposed Rule 
The proposed rule does have limits.  Its first limit is how 
much it could help poor, minority defendants.  The proposed 
rule still leaves poor, minority defendants without relief if 
there is no defense attorney involved.  This is a weaker part of 
the proposal and limits the number of people impacted by the 
rule.  However, this would require a change to when the right 
to counsel attaches, and this Note does not present that argu-
ment.  The proposed rule still makes an impact and begins to 
afford constitutional remedies to people who need it.207   
It could also be argued that the rule does very little in 
terms of any real impact because it could be circumvented by 
the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment precedent; the police 
might easily skirt the rule and still disadvantage poor and 
minority defendants.  A police officer, while perhaps unable to 
officially enter plea negotiations, can interrogate a defendant 
and persuade the defendant to plead with the prosecutor.  The 
proposed change in the law does not address the police officer 
conduct that can negatively influence a defendant before any 
attorney becomes involved in the case.  This conduct is regulated 
by the Fifth Amendment and thus outside of the scope of this 
Note.  There may be Fifth Amendment arguments that suffice 
for addressing the limited reach of the rule.  Given the consid-
erable advantages of the proposed rule, however, it should be 
adopted. 
 
E. Opposition to Extending Sixth Amendment Relief 
This proposed rule could raise serious opposition.  The 
most significant concern is that this proposed change requires 
the case to be heard by the Supreme Court, which must in turn 
rule in a way that provides for the proposed relief.  However, 
it should be noted that the modification does not depend on 
judicial action.  Instead, the prosecutorial ethics rules could be 
modified to effectively ban plea bargaining pre-indictment.208  
                                               
207 For example, it would have provided relief for John Turner in 
Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018). 
208 Current ethics rules within the pre-indictment context only deal 
with right to counsel issues and not when a lawyer is present and defending 
his client.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
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This is similar to the “no-contact” rule in federal and most state 
ethics rules, which requires that “a lawyer shall not communi-
cate about the subject of [a] representation with a party the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer 
or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”209  Some 
courts have interpreted this rule to mean that prosecutors 
cannot contact a represented defendant pre-indictment without 
having the defendant’s lawyer present.210  These ethical rules 
impact right to counsel issues because they still protect the ex 
ante concerns the Court considers in its attachment analysis.211  
A blanket rule forbidding pre-indictment negotiations 
all together does not adequately address the issues raised by 
Turner situations.  This proposed ethics rule change is not 
practical because pre-indictment plea negotiations should not 
be banned.212  While arguing for plea bargaining is not central 
to this Note, the efficiency of plea bargaining at any stage is 
exemplified by Alaska’s experiment banning plea bargaining 
post-indictment: the ban simply pushed plea deals to the pre-
indictment charging stage through a loophole in the law.213  
Prosecutors were not willing to give up a tool that made it 
more efficient to do their jobs.  Courts have also respected the 
efficiency of plea bargaining.214  It is hard to conceive that 
prosecutors would forego plea bargaining at any stage of the 
process, and banning efficient tools should not be supported.  
In fact, sophisticated defendants with more resources find it 
                                               
209 Id. 
210 See Salvatore, supra note 133, at 579. 
211 These ethical rules are right to counsel issues because they still 
protect the ex ante concerns the Court has in attachment issues.  See id.; 
United States. v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that 
the rule does not preclude routine investigation tactics).  
212 See White Carns & Kruse, supra note 22, at 30. 
213 Id. 
214 Instead of courts banning plea bargaining, they have simply 
extended rights to post-indictment plea bargaining.  See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 
566 U.S. 156 (2012). 
366 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 9:2 
 
very useful to bargain pre-indictment.215  Indigent defendants 
may not have this opportunity as often, but this should not 
inhibit their ability to negotiate pre-indictment when the 
opportunity presents itself.  When the less fortunate have the 
possibility to negotiate pre-indictment with counsel present, 
they should have the right for that counsel to be effective. 
Additionally, there is the critique that the text of the 
Sixth Amendment is why a bright-line rule exists, and therefore 
no Sixth Amendment relief can be sought until a formal 
charge or a hearing in front of a judge.216  At first glance, this 
makes sense.  The word “prosecution” in the Sixth Amendment 
seems to delimit when the Sixth Amendment can be applied 
to certain formal actions.  Not only does the text of the Sixth 
Amendment intuitively imply some formal case being brought 
before any of its right attach, but the history of the Sixth 
Amendment also leads courts to this interpretation.217  The 
colonists were focused on conducting fair trials, and the “Con-
tinental Congress asserted each citizen’s right to assistance of 
counsel in criminal trials.”218  This is because trials were taken 
for granted—criminal cases would usually have a trial.219  
Therefore, it seems fair for there to be a formal charge before 
any Sixth Amendment rights attach because defendants could 
always protect themselves at trial.  In fact, some argue that 
the right to counsel is simply a Sixth Amendment clause used 
to “breathe life into” the other promises the Sixth Amendment 
                                               
215 A New York Times article discussed the benefits of pre-indictment 
plea negotiating when discussing the Paul Manafort indictment: “Prosecutors 
bypassed the common Justice Department practice of inviting lawyers to 
meet and discuss potential indictments beforehand, often an opportunity for 
the defense to argue for leniency and for prosecutors to identify potential 
holes in their case.” Matt Flegenheimer, Andrew Weissmann, Mueller’s Legal 
Pit Bull, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/ 
us/politics/andrew-weissmann-mueller.html [https://perma.cc/L7E8-XTFJ].  
216 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (“That 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is consistent . . . 
with the literal language of the Amendment, which requires the existence 
of . . . a ‘criminal prosecutio[n]’ . . . .”). 
217 See Metzger, supra note 127, at 1637 (reviewing the development 
of the Supreme Court’s right to counsel precedent and highlighting the Court’s 
desire to protect lay defendants). 
218 Id. at 1640. 
219 Id. at 1639–40 (stating that the colonists were always concerned 
with putting up a legitimate and fair defense at trial). 
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guarantees—all except one, notice of charges, deal with rights 
during trial.220   
History suggests that the text of the Sixth Amendment 
was concerned with the adversarial process seen on television—
lawyers arguing in court in front of a jury or judge.  This is not 
the current context, however, and the Court has also understood 
the changes in the modern criminal justice system.221  The 
Court has extended the right to effective assistance of counsel 
to plea deals, despite the opportunity to have a fair trial, because 
“[t]he reality is that plea bargains have become so central to 
the administration of the criminal justice system that defense 
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process.”222  
The current criminal justice system is very different from the 
system that existed when the Framers drafted the Sixth 
Amendment.  So, the textual concerns the Court expresses when 
drawing the bright-line rule in the pre-indictment context is 
unwarranted for ineffective counsel during pre-indictment plea 
negotiations.  If the Supreme Court is going to condone plea 
bargaining and include it in its interpretation of a “criminal 
prosecution,” then extending the ineffective assistance of counsel 
strand of the Sixth Amendment to pre-indictment plea deals 
is no affront to the Sixth Amendment’s text. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel law appears at odds 
with providing any meaningful relief for defendants who enter 
into pre-indictment plea negotiations.  A bright-line rule exists 
that may preclude Sixth Amendment relief for any pre-
indictment conduct.  Yet, Sixth Amendment law has various 
strands that all raise different administrative concerns.  
Whereas right to counsel apparently requires ex ante clarity, 
courts review whether counsel was ineffective ex post.  This is 
because of the various administrative concerns the different 
rights raise.  However, these administrative concerns have also 
forced courts to pull apart the Sixth Amendment, applying it 
differently in different contexts, and even construing complaints 
in a manner that fits these varied concerns.  
                                               
220 Id. at 1640 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 139 (1997)).  
221 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).   
222 Id.  
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Fairness and justice require the Supreme Court to re-
solve the tension between current Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel doctrine and pre-indictment plea deal practices.  Plea 
bargaining is a daily aspect of the criminal justice system and 
can happen pre-indictment.  Yet, the criminal justice system 
must not support outcomes that are more likely to affect indigent 
defendants.  The criminal justice system must not support a 
system in which African American defendants receive dispro-
portionately harsher plea deals, any of which could happen 
pre-indictment and have no relief.  Therefore, there should be 
Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel relief from 
pre-indictment plea deals.  Other proposals fail to adequately 
address the policy implications of the current state of the law, 
and the proposal in this Note is administratively feasible without 
disrupting precedent. 
